BSI-DSZ-CC-0683-2014
for
IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-On, Version 8.2
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.02
BSI-DSZ-CC-0683-2014
Access Control System
IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise Single Sign-On
Version 8.2
from: IBM Corporation
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Bonn, 5 December 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0683-2014
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0683-2014 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0683-2014
Contents
A Certification.........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure..................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements.................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification...................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result....................................................................................9
5 Publication.......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results..........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE................................................................................................13
3 Security Policy...............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope........................................................................15
5 Architectural Information................................................................................................15
6 Documentation..............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing..........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration................................................................................................19
9 Results of the Evaluation...............................................................................................20
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE........................................................20
11 Security Target.............................................................................................................20
12 Definitions....................................................................................................................21
13 Bibliography.................................................................................................................23
C Excerpts from the Criteria.................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................26
D Annexes............................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0683-2014 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural
Description (BSI 7138) [3]
● BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0683-2014
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL 4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the
assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and certificates for Protection Profiles and
for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives
from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e.
for all assurance components selected.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise Single Sign-On, Version 8.2 has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise Single Sign-On,
Version 8.2 was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was
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completed on 31 October 2014. atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IBM Corporation.
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise Single Sign-On, Version 8.2 has
been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
7
IBM Corporation
11501 Burnet Road
Austin
Texas
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0683-2014 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise Single
Sign-On Version 8.2 with IMS Server Interim Fix 4 and AccessAgent Fix Pack 22. It is an
enterprise single-sign-on product for Microsoft Windows-based systems. The TOE
automatically, driven by rules, enters user credentials into credential-requesting
applications on behalf of the user once the user has successfully authenticated to the
TOE. The TOE further provides functions to audit user actions, protect the user's data and
manage these TOE security functions.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Audit Various components of the product generate audit events
which are stored in the IMS Server database. All user
application access logs are collated into the IMS Server's
audit log database. Each log record contains info related to
time and location from which a user accesses a certain
application.
Identification and Authentication The TOE supports an identification mechanism and an
authentication mechanism. The TOE maintains its own user
repository and performs user authentication against various
forms of authentication credentials stored in this repository
(stored in the IMS Server database). The user's ISAM E-SSO
Password is created when the account is first created (when
the user first sign's up).
User Data Protection The TOE supports a user data protection mechanism. The
TOE stores each user's credential data in a Wallet; one Wallet
per-user. A Wallet provides confidentiality and integrity
protection of the user credential data through the use of
cryptographic operations. All cryptographic operations are
performed by the Operational Environment.
Security management The TOE supports security function management
mechanisms. Role-based access control is used to protect
access to operations in the AccessAdmin and AccessAssistant
applications.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.1.
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The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.1 - 3.3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise Single Sign-On, Version 8.2
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
1 SW IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign on Suite (32bit)
8.2.0, Part Number
CRH6SML
DL
2 SW IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign on Suite (64bit)
8.2.0, Part Number CRH6TML DL
3 SW IMS Server Interim Fix 04 8.2.0
(8.2.0-ISSSAMESSOIMSIF00
04.zip)
DL
4 SW Access Agent Fixpack 22 (32bit) 8.2.0
(8.2.0-ISSSAMESSOAAFP00
22_32.msp)
DL
5 SW Access Agent Fixpack 22 (64bit) 8.2.0
(8.2.0-ISSSAMESSOAAFP00
22_64.msp)
DL
6 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-On Common Criteria Guide
8.2.0 (SC27-4365-00) DL
7 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-on Quick Start Guide
8.2.0 (GI11-8732-03) DL
8 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-on Installation Guide
8.2.0 (GI11-9309-01) DL
9 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-on Configuration Guide
8.2.0 (GC23-9692-01) DL
10 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-on Deployment Guide
8.2.0 (SC23-9952-03) DL
11 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-On Administrator Guide
8.2.0 (SC23-9951-03) DL
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No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
12 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-on User Guide
8.2.0 (SC23-9950-03) DL
13 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-on Help Desk Guide
8.2.0 (SC23-9953-03) DL
14 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-on Troubleshooting and Support
Guide
8.2.0 (GC23-9693-01) DL
15 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-on AccessStudio Guide
8.2.0 (SC23-9956-03) DL
16 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-On Policies Definition Guide
8.2.0 (SC23-9694-01) DL
17 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-on Provisioning Integration Guide
8.2.0 (SC23-9957-03) DL
18 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-On Web API for Credential
Management Guide
8.2.0 (SC14-7646-00) DL
19 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-on Context Management Integration
Guide
8.2.0 (SC23-9954-03) DL
20 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-On Serial ID SPI Guide
8.2.0 (SC14-7626-00) DL
21 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-On Lightweight AccessAgent mode
on Terminal Server SDK Guide
8.2.0 (SC14-7657-00) DL
22 DOC IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise
Single Sign-On Error Message Reference
Guide
8.2.0 (GC14-7624-00) DL
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is electronically downloaded using 2 steps:
1. The base version of the TOE is to be downloaded from passport advantage.
2. The TOE Fixpacks as well as the documentation is electronically downloaded from
the IBM support site.
The downloads are to be carried using the secure Download Director protocol.
The TOE can be identified by the user by its version numbers. The Access Agent version
number is: 8.2.0.3458. The IMS Version number is: 8.2.0.696
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Access Profiles: The TOE only releases a subset of the credential information
stored in a user's Wallet to the target application the user intends to identify and
authenticate to based on Access Profiles.
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● Audit: The TOE shall offer an audit mechanism that can be used to hold users of
each role accountable for security-relevant actions performed with the TSF.
● Authentication: The TOE must ensure that only authorized users gain access to
the TOE and its resources.
● Manage: The TSF must provide all the functions and facilities necessary to support
the authorized users that are responsible for the management of TOE security
mechanisms and must ensure that only authorized users are able to access such
functionality.
● Role: The TOE must assign a role to each user after successful identification and
authentication to the management facility. This role limits the management actions
the user is allowed to perform.
● Password Quality: When in GINA mode with Active Directory password
synchronization disabled, the TOE must ensure that the quality of the ISAM E-SSO
Password protecting the Common Symmetric Key (CSK) must possess the strength
to prevent credential guessing from threat agents.
● Wallet Access: The TOE must ensure that users can only access the contents of
the Wallet assigned to them.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● Cryptographic operations
● Competent individuals
● Password quality
● Physical protection
● Runtime environment
● Time source
● Users
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of multiple components executing in a distributed environment and
communicating using the network. Figure 1 in the Security Target [6] depicts the different
components forming the product. Each of the green shaded components are described in
the subsequent sections in the Security Target [6], chapter 1.5.2. These green shaded
components together form the TOE.
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6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The developer used 24 manual test cases where each test case may contain up to 100
sub tests (each test testing a specific aspect of a functionality).
Two test scripts are used that automatically test several functions related to wallet and role
management. The developer test evidence comprises many more tests cases but the
majority of them is not relevant for the evaluated functions.
7.1.1 Test Configuration
The developer tested all supported agent and IMS server platforms:
● AccessAgent on Windows XP/7 on 32bit and 64 bit (it includes GSKit which is part
of the TOE environment)
● IMS server on Windows Server 2008 32bit and 64bit
● WebSphere 7 (which includes Java) for databases, IBM DB2, Microsoft SQL Server,
and Oracle Database has been tested
Other settings relevant for the evaluated configuration (e.g. password strength or
enable/disabling certain functions) have been only used when it is needed for the tests.
7.1.2 Test approach
The manual developer tests were designed to use the GUI (Access Agent or IMS server
web interfaces). The manual tests consists of several test plan documents where one
document refers to the regression testing. The regression testing is a large collection of
tests that have been collected over time for each new version of the product. This ensures
that old functions still work on the latest release version.
The automated tests use the IMS API which is an internal TOE interface to the IMS server.
7.1.3 Testing Results
The developer testing was performed successfully with no exceptions by the developer on
all supported platforms.
7.2 Evaluator Testing Effort
The evaluator chose 28 developer tests for independent testing and created 7 new test
cases.
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7.2.1 Test Approach and Depth
The evaluator witnessed parts developer tests via a web conference, where a subset (9
developer tests) of the developer tests were executed based on the evaluator's choice.
18 other developer tests and all but one evaluator test have been executed on in the
ITSEF lab where the TOE has been installed. The evaluator test which involves the use of
the AccessStudio for access profiles application was performed on the developer test
systems.
The evaluators choice of the developer tests was to test all security functions (apart from
the auditing) and to also see all different types of supported platforms working. Specifically,
the following areas are covered by the independent testing of developer tests:
● releasing credentials to web applications and non-web applications as the core
functionality of the single-sign on operations
● authentication of AccessAgent users and IMS administrators
● policy management by help desk and administrative user roles
● password management by users
For the evaluator tests, the focus lay on:
● audit generation and review, especially testing the interaction between the
AccessAgent and the IMS server so that audit events get exchanged
● AccessAgent authentication in case the respective AD user account gets changed
(e.g. disabled) or client installation is not part of the AD domain
● creation and application of access profiles (the access profile that was created as
part of this test was used as input to the penetration testing when attempting to
obtain user credentials by forging applications)
All subsystems have been tested: while the tests of the user authentication applied to the
AccessAgent, all management and admin authentication tests used the AccessAdmin and
AccessAssistant subsystems. The IMS runtime was tested indirectly by using the
AccessAgent because the agent uses the IMS server interface to communicate with the
server. The configuration utilities were tested too as part of the access profile upload and
TOE configuration steps.
7.2.2 Test Configuration
The evaluator test configuration was the following:
● two AccessAgent (FixPack 22) client machines with WinXP 32-bit as underlying
platform
● IMS (Interim Fix 4) server installation with Windows Server 2008 32-bit as
underlying platform
● Active Directory as User Registry
● Applied configuration according to the evaluate configuration in the guidance as
necessary for the testing
● IBM DB2 9.7
The developer test setup consisted of a broader number of platforms (covering all
platforms that are defined for the evaluated configuration):
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● AccessAgent: WinXP 32/64 bit, Windows 7 32/64 bit
● IMS Server: Windows Server 2008 32/64 bit
7.2.3 Test Results
All tests have been performed successfully with the actual results matching the expected
results.
7.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator used the CVE for finding publicly documented vulnerabilities. None of the
found entries required independent testing.
The test effort based on all the developer evidence lead to the test of 14 potential
vulnerabilities, where some vulnerabilities might apply to a number of different functions.
Therefore, several tests where subdivided into testing the vulnerability aspect on several
functions.
The test approach was to generally aiming at authentication and authorization functions of
the TOE, i.e., the IMS server that enforces these security functions. This has been
performed through attempting to gain access to TOE interfaces that should not be
externally accessible, or use functions with unexpected parameter values (e.g. the
AccessAgent uses the IMS server login functions by always providing the correct domain
identifier, which is not the case when crafting requests to the IMS server manually).
Considering the type of the security functions that were attempted to violate, the testing
can be divided into these effects:
Testing the usability of invisible/deprecated functions that may violate authentication TSF,
as well as standard authentication functions with ill-formed parameters.
Testing the usability of invisible/deprecated functions that may violate authorization TSF,
as well as standard authorization functions.
Implicit test of wallet integrity through manipulating wallet data and its effect on single sign
for application. A brute-force attack was tested to verify whether the SFR for verification of
secrets holds.
Other tests were not target against a specific security objective, but attempted to observe
any suspicious behavior as a result of the ill-formed input data tests, which could then be
further analyzed.
Another group of tests where used to spot any interface functions among the complex
SOAP and WebSphere provided interfaces, that are available despite being hidden from
the network view according to the FSP. Any unexpectedly available interface could be
used to violate management function requirements.
7.3.1 Test configuration
The tests were performed on the TOE that was installed on one of the supported
WebSphere Application Server 7.0 on a Microsoft Windows Server 2008 32-bit platform for
the IMS server and a Microsoft Windows XP client installation. The test configuration in
terms of the evaluated configuration settings and software versions was the same than for
the evaluator's independent testing (following the evaluated configuration defined in the
CC-specific guidance provided by the developer).
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7.3.2 Results
The tests showed that a few more functions allow a password authentication but none of
the penetration tests revealed an exploitable vulnerability.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
● The use of personal secrets must be disabled.
● Only the AccessAgent plugins provided with the TOE are allowed.
● Only the ISAM E-SSO Password authentication factor is allowed.
● Second factor authentication is disallowed.
● Self-service policies:
● Self-service password reset must be disabled.
● Self-service authorization code issuance must be disabled.
● Self-service registration and bypass of 2nd factor must be disabled.
● Self-service registering of additional secrets during sign-up must be disabled.
● The IMS Server's master secret must be protected to only allow the Administrator
role access to it.
● One-Time Passwords (OTPs) must be disabled.
● Mobile ActiveCode (MAC) must be disabled.
● Roaming Desktops (i.e., the use of Microsoft Windows Terminal Server and Citrix
Presentation Server) must be disabled.
● RADIUS authentication must be disabled.
● Windows Fast User Switching must be disabled on Windows 7 systems running
AccessAgent.
● Private Desktop must be disabled on Windows XP systems running AccessAgent.
● Single sign-on to AccessAdmin when using Microsoft Internet Explorer must be
disabled.
● The IMS Server/application must be the only application running in the WebSphere
Application Server (WAS).
● The TOE's password synchronization option with Active Directory affects the
security of the TOE. Specifically, enabling password synchronization with Active
Directory will disable the TOE's ability to enforce password quality requirements.
● The feedback email settings in AccessAssistant and Web Workplace must not be
enabled.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
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Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products,
protection profiles and sites (BSI 7138) and Requirements regarding the Evaluation
Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites under the CC
and ITSEC (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0683-2014, Version 1.19, 2014-03-05, IBM Security
Access Manager for Enterprise Single Sign-On Version 8.2 with IMS Server Interim
Fix 4 and AccessAgent Fix Pack 22 Security Target, IBM Corporation
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2014-09-22, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec information security GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] CM Lists, file name: CM.LISTS.real-final-final-final.zip, Date: 2014-09-22
[9] Security Access Manager for Enterprise Single Sign-On: Configuration Guide,
Version GC23-9692-01, Date: 2012-04-02
8
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 13, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des
Herstellers
• AIS 23, Version 3, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler (Collection of Developer
Evidence)
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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